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What role(s) do emotions have in choice 
preference? Individuals’ choices depend on 
their memories and cognition but also on 
their current emotional state. Emotions can 
play a necessary functional role in decision-
making, but in doing this, emotions can alter 
the stability of the process. The argument 
for a necessary functional role of emotions 
is supported by converging evidence from 
neuropsychological patients with impair-
ments in either emotional responding or 
in decision-making, alongside human brain 
imaging. We also point out that functional 
brain imaging studies need to target brain 
areas responding to emotion in order to 
provide stronger evidence for emotion spe-
cifically modulating the process of decision-
making to influence choice preference.
Neuropsychological aNd fMri 
studies of the vmpfc aNd other 
braiN regioNs
Neuropsychological studies have shown 
that patients with damage to ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) brain regions 
display flattened emotions, an inability 
to respond to emotional events, and less 
responsiveness to punishment (Fellows and 
Farah, 2005; Naqvi et al., 2006). In addition, 
patients with vmPFC lesions show impaired 
decision-making. It has been argued that 
this impaired decision-making reflects 
altered emotional reactivity. The “somatic 
marker hypothesis” proposes that in situ-
ations where choices could bring either 
positive reward or negative outcomes and 
losses, decision-making is modulated by the 
ability to recruit emotional feedback from 
past events (Bechara et al., 1994). The Iowa 
gambling task (IGT; Anderson et al., 1999) 
has been used to test this hypothesis and 
examine the phenomena of poor decision-
making in patients with damage to pre-
frontal cortex. Players must select a card 
from one of four decks. Each card leads to 
winning or losing money. Unknown to the 
player, some decks contain cards with higher 
gains and losses, which if repeatedly selected 
will lead to an overall loss. Over the course 
of multiple trials, typical players begin to 
avoid these high risk decks. Patients, on 
the other hand, were found to be unable to 
forgo immediate gains for long-term reward 
to win the game. The results also showed 
that patients with vmPFC damage, unlike 
healthy controls, did not produce skin-con-
ductance responses (SCRs), a physiologi-
cal measure of emotional responsiveness, 
before making choices that had negative 
outcomes. The vmPFC may therefore be 
necessary for the emotional evaluation of 
future choices. Interestingly, patients with 
amygdala damage were also found to per-
form poorly on the gambling task (Bechara 
et al., 1999; Weller et al., 2007). However, 
unlike vmPFC patients, amygdala patients 
not only failed to emotionally react in antic-
ipation of a negative choice, but failed to 
produce SCRs after negative decision out-
comes. This suggests that the amygdala is 
part of a feedback circuit that evaluates the 
emotional outcome of choices, modulating 
prefrontal regions. Emotional associations 
can thus bias choice preference. Note that 
the emotional state of the participant in 
these paradigms can change rapidly across 
trials, and the data suggest that this modu-
lates decision-making. Emotional modula-
tion of decision-making can make human 
choice contextually dependent, but this is 
at the cost of stability in decision-making, 
across different emotional contexts.
These results contrast with at least some 
of the results from functional magnetic res-
onance imaging (fMRI) studies, for instance 
Lawrence et al. (2009) carried out an fMRI 
study of healthy control participants per-
forming the IGT. The blood-oxygenation-
level dependent (BOLD) contrast was 
accessed across specific time periods within 
each choice trial. The BOLD signal (based 
on blood flow) is proportional to neural 
activity. Comparing activity at the point 
where participants found out the outcome 
of their decision (i.e., when a reward or pun-
ishment from making a choice was shown) 
revealed more activity in the caudate, 
nucleus accumbens, insula, and thalamus 
for choices which yielded a reward (win-
ning money) compared to responses which 
resulted in punishment (losing money). 
They also compared activity between trials 
where participants had to actively choose a 
card to those where participants had to select 
specified card decks. Regions of the vmPFC, 
implicated in the neuropsychological stud-
ies were more active for decision-making 
trials than for control trials. More specifi-
cally, higher BOLD activity was reported in 
bilateral areas of the medial orbitofrontal 
cortex (BA 11), as well as in regions of the 
ventral anterior cingulate cortex (BA 24 and 
32), extending to the caudate. In addition, 
when making choices that would lead to 
overall losses of money in the task, neural 
activity was found in the orbital frontal cor-
tex and insula. Other fMRI studies using 
the IGT have found similar activity in the 
medial frontal gyrus (BA 10; Fukui et al., 
2005; Windmann et al., 2006). These results 
point to a role of orbito- and medial-frontal 
cortex in relation to positive and negative 
aspects of reward in the IGT, but they do not 
necessarily demonstrate the involvement 
of emotion-based influences on decision-
making as opposed to other aspects of the 
evaluation process. Indeed, other research 
suggest that key neural regions that form 
part of the neural circuitry for emotional 
responding, namely the amygdala and hip-
pocampus, are not involved during the task 
(Li et al., 2010).
To assess whether there is a more specific 
role of emotion in the IGT, we have recently 
assessed activity in brain regions specifically 
associated with positive and negative emo-
tional responses. Participants viewed pre-
categorized images from the International 
Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang et al., 
1997) conveying positive, negative, and 
neutral valence. Regions found to be more 
activated by positive than negative emotion, 
and vice versa, were then used as regions 
of interest for the analysis of brain activity 
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motivational state, which if affected, results 
in less goal-directed behavior (Brown and 
Pluck, 2000; Marin and Wilkosz, 2005). 
The anterior cingulum, nucleus accum-
bens, ventral pallidum, thalamus, and the 
ventral tegmental area form the core of the 
neural system recruited for motivation, 
and the nucleus accumbens, ventral palli-
dum, and thalamus have been suggested to 
modulate motivation (Marin and Wilkosz, 
2005). Marin (1996) posits that apathy 
emerges when there is damage to this cir-
cuitry. Similar neural networks including 
neural areas such as the anterior cingulate 
and nucleus accumbens are also related to 
performance on the IGT. The basal ganglia 
has also been reported to be involved in con-
veying motivational signals to and from the 
frontal cortex (van Reekum et al., 2005) for 
decision-making. Damage of the basal gan-
glia may be critical for apathy and may lead 
to impaired performance in the IGT. A clear 
future direction for research is to assess the 
role of different brain regions affected in a 
wide variety of disorders where apathetic 
symptoms may occur (e.g., in Parkinson’s 
disease in relation to the basal ganglia), to 
test for a modulating role on decision-mak-
ing which has implications on the stability 
of choice preference.
Functional magnetic resonance imag-
ing has revealed the involvement of vmPFC 
and subcortical regions in decision-making. 
This is informative about the neural areas 
affected in motivational disorders that have 
been postulated to involve similar neural 
networks. Further studies that combine 
neuropsychological analyses with func-
tional brain imaging should provide evi-
dence not only that damage to brain regions 
dealing with emotional responding can alter 
neural activity in decision-making, but also 
that emotional change acts as a mediator of 
choice preference. Any mediating effect of 
emotion will change the stability of deci-
sion-making, making choice preference 
both more labile and more flexible than 
would be the case if decisions were purely 
cognitive in nature.
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decisions are made. To evaluate whether 
this context plays a causal role in decision-
making, though, requires that further steps 
are taken, which we consider below.
apathy aNd associated braiN 
MechaNisMs
Understanding the role of emotion in deci-
sion-making that is influence by current 
emotional state on a moment to moment 
basis, strongly effecting stability of choice 
has important clinical implications. Apathy 
is a disorder of diminished motivation that 
affects every day adaptive behavior (Marin 
et al., 1994). Clinical studies have found that 
motivational loss as a result of apathy affects 
quality of life by (amongst other things) 
reducing social interactions (Resnick et al., 
1998; Reid-Arndt et al., 2007).
Njomboro (2009) examined the perfor-
mance of brain-injured patients either with 
or without symptoms of apathy. Apathetic 
patients showed reduced effects of reward in 
the IGT, and were neither strongly affected by 
high reward values in the initial stages of the 
task nor by longer-term reward outcomes as 
the task progressed. The results suggest that 
lowered emotional responding, found in apa-
thetic patients, can have a direct effect on the 
reward-mediated decision-making. Emotion 
mediates the effects of a reward, influencing 
individual’s choices, however this pathway 
may not be present in these patients.
Clinical studies have investigated the 
roles that neural structures and circuits 
play in bringing about and maintaining a 
during the IGT. A comparison was carried 
out on the percentage of change in BOLD 
signal between individuals who learned the 
task (who selected more cards from advan-
tageous card decks) and non-learners (who 
selected more cards from disadvantageous 
card decks). Example data from the region 
specific to positive emotion in the time 
period in response to choice outcome are 
presented in Figure 1.
The region of interest analysis revealed 
that activation in the left temporal pole var-
ied as a function of the type of reinforce-
ment (i.e., positive or negative outcome). 
Other results suggest that the left temporal 
pole is a crucial part of the neural network 
involved in emotional reactivity (Lee et al., 
2004; Britton et al., 2006). Thus, the results 
indicate that a critical brain area involved 
in emotional responding (the left temporal 
pole), and independently defined in rela-
tion to emotional stimuli, was differentially 
activated in the IGT. While supporting the 
case for emotion-based modulation of deci-
sion-making in the IGT, we note also that 
there was no evidence for differential acti-
vation of the vmPFC, though this was acti-
vated in our emotional localizer task (the 
IAPS). Hence, it remains unclear whether 
any involvement of the vmPFC in the IGT 
reflects emotion-based responding or other 
aspects of decision-making. Irrespective of 
this, the results indicate that brain areas 
involved in emotion are significantly active 
during decision-making, and provide a 
context for temporary instability when 
Figure 1 | Blood-oxygenation-level dependent signal change for winning- and losing-trials in the left 
temporal pole (a region specific to positive emotions i.e., positive minus neutral contrast of iAPS 
picture rating task. L, learners (who chose from advantageous card decks more frequently). NL, non-learners. 
Activity was higher for the winning trials, F(3,57) = 7.562, p < 0.001. Error bars denote SD of the group.
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